Abstract. The well-known Signed ElGamal scheme consists of ElGamal encryption with a non-interactive Schnorr proof of knowledge. While this scheme should be intuitively secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model, its security has not yet been proven nor disproven so far, without relying on further non-standard assumptions like the generic group model. Currently, the best known positive result is that Signed ElGamal is non-malleable under chosen-plaintext attacks.
ness. To this end, we rule out a large class of common proof techniques. The obstacle encountered by Shoup and Gennaro seems to be very solid indeed.
State of the art
We summarise previous work on the security of Signed ElGamal in the table in Figure 1 , ordered by the strength of the model. paper result model [6] NM-CPA secure ROM [16] obvious CCA proof fails ROM [15] not PA2 unless CDH easy ROM [5] no adaptive extractor under OMDL ROM this work no CCA reduction under IES ROM [1] CCA ROM + algebraic adv. Although CCA security of Signed ElGamal has sometimes been claimed informally, the strongest formal result in the ROM to date [6] only shows the weaker notion of non-malleability (NM-CPA). If one extends the ROM to include either the generic group model [14] , a generic knowledge assumption [17] or restricts to algebraic adversaries [1] then one can prove CCA security. Conversely, we know that in the plain ROM the obvious CCA proof fails [16] . Signed ElGamal cannot be ROM-PA2 plaintext aware unless CDH is easy [15] which rules out proofs based on non-rewinding extractors for the contained ZK proof. The strongest negative result to date [5] rules out any CCA proof based on adaptive extractors for the ZK proof, by showing that the proof scheme in question (Fiat- Shamir-Schnorr) is not adaptively secure unless the one-more discrete logarithm (OMDL) problem is easy.
Adaptive proofs of knowledge. To put our results in context, we outline and discuss the results of Bernhard et al. [5] , explain their limits and how we improve on them. Their work identies the notion of adaptive proofs of knowledge as a potential bottleneck towards proving IND-CCA security for Signed ElGamal: this notion is what seems to be necessary to make the intuition behind encypt-then-prove work, yet it is provably not achieved by its implementation based on Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr proofs in Signed ElGamal.
In a hypothetical CCA-to-IND-CPA reduction of Signed to plain ElGamal, when the adversary asks a decryption query on a ciphertext, the reduction rewinds the adversary to extract the plaintext. Shoup and Gennaro [16] considered an adversary who makes a chain of n ciphertexts, the plaintext of each one depending on the last ciphertext (e.g. through a hash function), then asks decryption queries in reverse order. The eect of this adversary is to make a straightforward rewinding strategy take exponential time in n, as the reduction ends up re-rewinding the rewound adversaries each time.
Bernhard et al. [5] were the rst to show that such an exponential expansion is unavoidable under certain conditions. A non-interactive proof of knowledge is, informally speaking, a construction in which you can extract a witness from a single proof given suitable powers (e.g. the ability to rewind the prover). Bernhard et al. proposed a notion of adaptive proofs in which the prover can make a sequence of proofs and the extractor must return the found witnesses to the prover. In this way, should the prover ever succeed in making a proof for which she does not know a witness, she gains knowledge from the extractor. The game is adaptive in the sense that the extractor must deliver the witness for the k-th proof before the prover prepares the (k + 1)-st proof.
Bernhard et al. proved that (unlike a construction of Fischlin [10] ) FiatShamir-Schnorr proofs are not adaptively secure, unless the one-more discrete logarithm (OMDL) problem is easy in the group concerned. Specically, any adaptive extractor must either take at least 2 n time on an adapted version of Shoup/Gennaro's adversary, or reduce to solving OMDL.
Their results rules out a proof of IND-CCA security for Signed ElGamal which considers the basic encryption scheme and the non-interactive proofs in isolation, such as one might do following the encrypt-then-prove intuition. The intuition is that the reduction would not be able to answer decryption queries by relying on an extractor for the Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr proofs, as such an extractor does not exists.
Strictly speaking however, their result only rules out an extractor that obtains the randomness used in the ciphertexts and not one that somehow obtains only the underlying plaintexts. Yet, there is a signicant complexity gap between these two problems: nding the plaintext is equivalent to solving a CDH problem (with the aid of rewinding) whereas nding the randomness (again with the aid of rewinding) is equivalent to taking a discrete logarithm. This means that the result outlined above does not rule out all plausible reductions. In addition, the result does not immediately apply to the combination of ElGamal ciphertext and proof that makes up Signed ElGamal.
Our Contribution
We narrow the gap between the positive and negative results by showing that, in the ROM, one cannot construct any black-box key-passing reduction from CCA-security of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA security of plain ElGamal unless Schnorr proofs are insecure (specically, they can help you solve CDH). We view this result as strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Signed ElGamal is not CCA secure in the ROM.
Technically, we show a metareduction whose starting point is any reduction from the IND-CCA security to IND-CPA of ElGamal, where the reduction makes only black-box use of the adversary and which is key-passing in the sense that it hands the public key in the ElGamal scheme to the adversary. Our metareduction turns such a reduction into an algorithm against an assumption which we call the Interactive ElGamal-Schnorr assumption, or IES in short. Informally, the IES assumption is the following.
You are given an ElGamal public key and a ciphertext on an unknown, random message. You can play the verier in a single interactive Schnorr proof of the randomness in the ciphertext. Then you cannot extract the encrypted message.
We remark that we are not proposing a new assumption for the purpose of giving a cryptosystem that is secure under this assumption. Instead, we are
showing that an already well-known cryptosystem cannot be proven CCA secure unless a plausible assumption is actually false in which case we would be distrustful of any cryptosystem employing Schnorr proofs. Since IES is closely related to CDH, we would also have concerns about the use of any ElGamalbased scheme in a group in which IES is easy.
Outline of this work
We begin by recalling the denition of Signed ElGamal and the IND-CPA/CCA notions for encryption. We then present and justify the IES assumption and prove that for any group, if there is an ecient key-passing reduction from CCA of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA of ElGamal then IES is eciently breakable in the group concerned. Our result even shows that proving CCA1 security,
where the adversary makes all decryption queries before learning the challenge ciphertext, is hard.
Preliminaries

Cryptographic groups
A cryptographic group is a group G of some prime order q together with a designated generator g, in which one can perform the group operation and inversion eciently. It follows that one can also eciently exponentiate in such groups.
Typical examples (that have interesting security properties) are subgroups of the multiplicative group Z × p for primes p and groups derived from elliptic curves over nite elds.
Public-key encryption and ElGamal
A public-key encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: KeyGen which produces a public and a secret key, Encrypt which takes a message and a public key and produces a ciphertext and Decrypt which takes a secret key and ciphertext and produces either a message or the symbol ⊥ to indicate failure. Decryption is deterministic. If you generate a key pair, encrypt a message with the public key then decrypt the ciphertext with the matching secret key then you get the same message back.
The ElGamal encryption scheme over a group G (generated by g, of order q) has key pairs of the form (g x , x) for x ∈ Z q ; to generate a secret key one picks a random integer x modulo q. To encrypt a message m ∈ G to public key y ∈ G, pick a random r ∈ Z q , your ciphertext is (g r , m · y r ). To decrypt a ciphertext (c, d) with secret key x compute d/c
x .
The IND-CPA and IND-CCA security notions are given by the following game. To begin, the game generates a key pair and returns the public key.
Once in the game, you may pick two messages (m 0 , m 1 ) of the same length 4 in response to which the game picks β ∈ {0, 1} randomly and gives you a challenge encryption c * of m β . In the CCA version of the game only, you may ask the game to decrypt any ciphertext for you, as often as you like and both before and after obtaining the challenge except that after obtaining the challenge c * , you may not ask for c * itself to be decrypted. Your aim is to guess β. Your success probability σ is the probability that you guess β correctly (taken over all random choices made by the game) and your advantage α is dened as 2σ − 1, so a perfect guesser has advantage 1 and a uniform random guesser has advantage 0.
For a sequence of groups G λ indexed by a security parameter λ ∈ N, the ElGamal encryption scheme is said to be (asymptotically) IND-CPA/CCA secure if the advantage of any ecient adversary (who receives λ as input in unary notation) in the corresponding game over group G λ is negligible as a function of the parameter λ. 
Schnorr proofs
Over a cryptographic group G with designated generator g and order q, the Schnorr proof scheme is a protocol for a prover to convince a verier that he knows a secret x such that y = g x , where y may be known to the verier in advance. The prover picks a random a ∈ Z q and sends y and g a to the verier who replies with a challenge c drawn randomly from Z q . The prover answers with s = a + cx (mod q) and the verier accepts if and only if g s = g a · y
c .
The Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr protocol is a non-interactive version of the above.
Instead of the verier picking c, the prover picks it herself as c = 
Metareductions
A cryptographic security denition often takes the form of a game: an algorithm with one interface and a notion of winning. Specically, a scheme is secure if there is no ecient adversary (an algorithm with one interface, compatible with that of the game) such that if we connect the adversary to the game, the adversary wins (with more than a negligible chance).
A reduction from source problem (e.g. IND-CPA of ElGamal) to a target problem (e.g. DDH) is an algorithm with two interfaces, one for a source-problem adversary and one for the target-problem game. The aim of a proof by reduction is to show that for any adversary who could win the source game, the system obtained by composing the adversary and the reduction would win the target game. This system is itself an algorithm with one interface, which is compatible with the target game.
A metareduction is an algorithm with three interfaces. A proof by metareduction shows that there can be no reduction from a source problem S to a target problem T unless another problem U is already easy. The metareduction's rst two interfaces are those of an S-adversary and a T -game; the third 5 A variant of the protocol has the prover send (y, c, s) which is often shorter as it consists of one group element and two integers instead of two group elements and one integer. This variant is identical to the protocol presented here for security purposes.
interface is compatible with the U -game. In a proof by metareduction, we take a hypothetical S-to-T reduction and connect its S and T interfaces to those of the metareduction. In other words, composing a S, T, U metareduction with a S, T reduction gives a system with one free interface of type U , and this whole system can be connected to the U -game.
A metareduction will typically simulate a perfect S-adversary. The accompanying proof will show that if the reduction wins the T -game given a perfect S-adversary, then the metareduction wins the U -game given the reduction. In most cases, security of the U -game should only hold against ecient adversaries, such that the metareduction is typically also required to obey this running time bound.
The IES assumption
The interactive Schnorr proof scheme is known to be a correct, honest-verier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm. The non-interactive (Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr) version is full zero-knowledge in the ROM. We propose an assumption that we call IES (Interactive ElGamal-Schnorr) that looks at an interactive Schnorr proof on an ElGamal ciphertext for a random message.
While weaker than assuming such a proof to be zero-knowledge, IES states the assumption that such a proof does not leak the encrypted message.
Suppose you are given an ElGamal public key y = g x and an encryption (u, v) = (g r , my r ) for a random group element m. In addition, you receive a Schnorr commitment g a for a random a and can pick c ∈ Z q , in response to which you get s = a + cr (mod q). The IES assumption is then that you cannot recover m. Denition 2. Given three uniformly random and independent group elements
a ) in a cryptographic group G of order q with generator g, the IES problem is to compute g rx (the CDH problem) where one, after receiving (g
may pick a single value c ∈ Z q and learns s = a + cr (mod q) as a one-time auxiliary information.
This denition shows that IES is stronger than CDH since a CDH solver could break IES trivially. The justication that s should not help is the same one as for the interactive Schnorr proof: since a is uniformly random in Z q and independent of r, x, if g a were not provided then s would be uniform and independent of r, x itself and the problem would reduce to CDH. The IES assumption formalises the idea that giving out g a as well, which is also independent of the CDH problem on r, x, should not help you either.
6 Computational Die-Hellman: given random group elements g x , g y compute g
xy .
For IES adversaries who pick c independently of a, the IES assumption reduces to CDH with the help of a rewinding reduction. Given a CDH instance
(g x , g r ) one can pick a random g a and run the adversary up to the point where she produces c, then pick a random s and set h = g s /(g r )
c and rerun the adversary on (g x , g r , h). As long as the same c appears in the second run, the simulation is sound (in particular the adversary can verify that she got the correct s). This is of course exactly how one simulates Schnorr proofs to show honest-verier zero-knowledge of the protocol. Like for Schnorr proofs, the simulation argument breaks down if the adversary chooses c depending on g a but there is no known attack to exploit this technique.
The dierence between breaking IES and extracting a witness from a Schnorr proof is that the former requires only nding a particular group element whereas the latter involves recovering an integer (exponent). An adversary who can recover x from a Schnorr proof (g x , g a , c, s = a + cx) can take discrete logarithms.
The result of Bernhard et al. on Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr shows that one cannot build a CCAtoIND-CPA reduction for Signed ElGamal by extracting the witness (the encryption randomness) from the Schnorr proof in a ciphertext.
However, the main task for such a reduction is to answer decryption queries, for which it suces to recover the encrypted message (a group element).
Main theorem
Our goal is to exclude reductions from CCA security of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA security of plain ElGamal (equivalently, to DDH). We make three constraints on the class of reductions that we consider. First, we consider only efcient reductions, since an exponential-time reduction could exhaustively search the key-space. Secondly, we consider rewinding black-box reductions: our reductions may invoke any number of copies of the adversary as long as the reduction is ecient overall. Each invocation of the adversary counts as a single operation. All these copies of the adversary run with the same random string. The reduction is in charge of all communication to and from these copies, including random oracle calls. In particular the reduction can employ the usual special soundness forking strategies. All computation from the moment the reduction sends a message to a copy of the adversary up to the adversary's reply counts as a single operation as far as the reduction is concerned.
Finally, we consider only key-passing reductions. A reduction to IND-CPA receives a public key from the IND-CPA challenger whereas a CCA adversary expects a public key; keys for plain and Signed ElGamal are of the same form.
A key-passing reduction is one that gives all copies of the adversary the same public key which it received from its challenger. Alternatively, one could view the public key as being made available globally to all parties (the reduction and the copies of the adversary) via the IND-CPA challenger.
Why key-passing? We provide some intuition and the technical reasons for the key-passing assumption. Due to the rewinding nature of the Schnorr protocol extractor, we must allow our reduction access to multiple copies of the adversary with full control over the random oracle. Yet we do not want to oer the reduction the option to substitute a key of its own (for which it may know the secret key)
for some copies of the adversary, which would lead to the following problem: The reduction may rst run multiple copies of the adversary under self-chosen keys and test if the adversary succeeds in predicting the challenge bit with suciently high probability, exploiting knowledge of the secret key for answering decryption queries in this part. Only if this test phase is over, it may start the actual reduction to the IND-CPA challenger's public key.
While an actual adversary would pass the test phase of the reduction above, any metareduction most likely will fail to reach the second phase. The reason is simply that it would need to eciently break CCA security under the reduction's keys. More precisely, if the metareduction treats the reduction as a black box, then one could potentially even mount meta-metareduction techniques (i.e., now playing against the metareduction) as in [11] to base this argument on formal grounds. Still, it seems that this testing reduction is somewhat contrived, as it is not known how the test phase helps to break CPA security for the given key.
Technically, the chosen-key problem appears when our metareduction tries to inject an IES challenge into the reduction's view. The reduction, on input the challenger's public key pk, could both substitute a key of its own (for which it knows the secret key, but which is independent of the IES challenger) or the reduction could rerandomise pk by picking random r and returning pk r . In this case the reduction cannot directly decrypt anything, but there is a dependency on the IES challenger's key. Intuitively, creating further keys of its own should not help the reduction to attack the challenger. But to a metareduction, both these tactics are indistinguishable: the resulting key looks random in both cases.
If the metareduction injects an IES challenge into a ciphertext for which the reduction knows the secret key, all bets are o the metareduction cannot simulate an adversary consistently anymore.
The solution to the above dilemma would be to somewhat grant the metareduction access to the reduction's self-chosen secretkeys. Note that it would not be sucient to ask that each public key comes with a Schnorr signature of knowledge of its secret key (perhaps signed by the challenger) the reduction controls the random oracle towards the adversary, so it could easily forge such signatures. But, in principle, other secure means of proofs of knowledge could help. Alternatively, switching to more transparent types of reductions such as algebraic or generic ones could also be a viable path.
It would be interesting to see whether the key-passing requirement could be weakened in future work. A more complicated argument (with looser concrete security bounds) may well succeed, but for now we prefer to work in the keypassing model.
Our main result is the following theorem that excludes a large class of attempts to prove Signed ElGamal CCA-secure. The proof of the following also reveals that showing even CCA1 security is hard. Theorem 1. Suppose that DDH and IES hold in a cryptographic group G. Then there is no ecient key-passing black-box reduction from CCA security of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA security of plain ElGamal in G.
The Proof
We will construct a metareduction to IES from any CCAtoCPA reduction for Signed ElGamal. We introduce some variants of IES that will make the proof easier to present. We note that this does not introduce additional assumptions for our result: we show that they all reduce to IES.
Veriable IES
First, we deal with the issue that decrypted messages are not veriable. Proofs of knowledge are usually taken over NP relations (e.g. discrete logarithm). However, the statement that a ciphertext decrypts to a particular message is not immediately veriable it would require either the secret key or the encryption randomness to verify.
Our metareduction will have to check the decryptions produced by the reduction with which it interacts. We introduce a new assumption that we call veriable IES or vIES to give the metareduction this ability; we also show that vIES reduces to IES. The new feature of vIES is that the adversary gets many attempts at guessing the message; formally we introduce a new oracle for the adversary to check messages.
Denition 3 (vIES)
. The vIES problem in a cryptographic group (G, q, g) is to solve IES given the extra ability to check candidate solutions. Given (g
one may once submit a value c ∈ Z q and learn s = a + cr (mod q) in return; in addition, one may query an oracle check(m) many times which returns 1 if and only if m = g rx . One wins the game if one can nd g rx . A code-based presentation of the game is given in Figure 2 .
The vIES assumption reduces to the IES assumption with a loss in soundness of a factor k + 1 where k is the number of checks made by the adversary. To see this, consider an ecient adversary with probability p of winning the vIES game and let k be a (polynomial) bound on the number of checks the adversary makes. Then with probability p, one of the following k + 1 events occur: E i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k is the event that the adversary makes at least i checking queries and the i-th check contains the correct message; E 0 is the event that the adversary never makes a checking query on the correct message but still calls the nalization oracle with the correct message. If event E i occurs then the reduction for case i will break IES. Since we assumed the adversary to succeed with probability p, at least one of the events will occur with probability p/(k + 1) as the k + 1 events are a partition of the event that the adversary succeeds. Since the reduction chooses i uniformly, we conclude that it succeeds against IES with probability p/(k + 1).
One-more veriable IES
For our metareduction we use a one-more variation of IES, for the same reason that Bernhard et al.'s proof that Fiat-Shamir-Schnorr is not adaptively secure requires the one-more discrete logarithm assumption. Unlike the cited theorem and assumption, the one-more IES assumption reduces to the basic one. We give the one-more assumption and reduction for veriable IES; the same reduction holds for the non-veriable variation.
The one-more assumption works as follows. The adversary may obtain and open a number of IES instances; her aim is to solve an unopened instance. The initialization oracle produces a public key g x shared between all instances. The instance oracle creates a fresh pair (g r , g a ) together with an internal ag f = 0 to denote that this instance is fresh. The adversary may issue a challenge c once per instance, to which the challenger replies with s = a+cr and sets the ag to f = 1 to denote that the challenge for this instance has been provided. In addition, the adversary may ask for an instance to be opened to which the challenger responds with (r, a) and sets f = 2. As in vIES, the adversary may also ask to check a value m against an instance, in which case the challenger reveals if m = g rx .
Checking does not aect the ag f . The adversary wins by providing the value m = g rx on an instance that has not been opened, i.e. f ≤ 1. The one-more veriable IES game is asymmetric in that the adversary must only solve a CDH instance to win but the game must provide a discrete logarithm r on request. It is this asymmetry that makes our metareduction work. Nonetheless, one-more veriable IES reduces to plain IES. In the code-based presentation of the game in Figure 3 , an index i is used to distinguish dierent instances.
Denition 4 (OMvIES). The one-more veriable IES game is given by the code in Figure 3 .
procedure initialise:
return X procedure instance:
procedure nalise(i, m):
if f > 1 then return 0 endif; return check(i, m)
oracle challenge(i, c):
oracle check(i, m):
return (r, a) The reader may be asking why they should have any condence that an assumption as complex as OMvIES should be hard. We note that vIES and OMvIES derive their justication solely from the fact that they reduce to IES: they are intermediate steps to make our main proof easier, not assumptions in their own right that we ask anyone to believe in. The justication for basic IES we gave when we introduced it, that a single Schnorr proof should not completely break the security of ElGamal encryption. The reason that the one-more version reduces to the simple one is that the instances are independent in the sense that the adversary cannot perform a challenge query that touches more than one instance.
Lemma 1. There is a reduction from OMvIES to IES that loses a factor
in soundness where k is a bound on the number of queries made by the adversary.
Proof. It suces to reduce OMvIES to vIES with a loss of O(k). Given an upper
bound k on the number of instances an adversary can create, pick n $ ← {1, . . . , k} at random and use the vIES challenger for the n-th instance. Simulate all other instances by picking fresh (r, a) . To open a simulated instance, simply reveal (r, a). To check a simulated instance against a candidate m, check if m = X r . If the adversary tries to open the n-th instance, abort. If the adversary succeeds with probability p against OMvIES then she succeeds with probability at least p/k against the n-th instance, in which case she cannot have opened this instance. So the reduction wins the vIES game with at least p/k probability too.
A model adversary
Let R be a rewinding, black-box, key-passing reduction from CCA security of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA security of plain ElGamal. That is, R may invoke multiple copies of a CCA adversary A which expects to receive a public key, can make one challenge and many decryption queries and will output a guess bit. R itself can interact with one IND-CPA challenger who provides a public key and a single challenge query, which returns a plain ElGamal ciphertext.
The aim of R is to guess its challenger's bit β. We rst construct an inecient adversary A that breaks CCA of Signed ElGamal with advantage 1, that is it guesses correctly all the time. Our adversary A will operate in three phases: phases 1 and 2 are ecient and if a reduction R advances our adversary to phase 3 then R must have already broken an assumption (IES or DDH) itself or launched exponentially many copies of the adversary. We also show how to construct an ecient simulation of (multiple copies of ) A under these conditions, yielding our metareduction. Thus, using an inecient adversary in the rst place does not cause triviality problems.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that q > 5 and consider the inecient adversary A n in Figure 4 where Ψ : Z q [X] → Z q is a random function 7 (since eciency is not an issue, random functions exist). RO is a random oracle call and dlog takes a discrete logarithm (which an inecient adversary can also do). Decrypt and Challenge are calls to the CCA challenger.
Adversary A n runs in three phases. In phase 1, it builds up a chain of n Signed ElGamal ciphertexts in such a way that the randomness used in each ciphertext depends on the challenge returned from the random oracle in the previous one. Indeed, A n only draws one random value to initialise S and uses the random function Ψ to update its state afterwards. One can think of S as the current state of a internal pseudorandom number generator.
In phase 2, our adversary asks decryption queries in reverse order, in the manner rst proposed by Shoup and Gennaro [16] and used by Bernhard et al. [5] . Crucially, our adversary checks the correctness of each decryption and aborts if the CCA game resp. reduction to which it is connected tries to cheat by returning a false decryption. By the time our adversary reaches phase 3, it is 7 By choosing the polynomial ring over Zq as the domain, we mean that Ψ takes arbitrary-length nite sequences of integers modulo q as input. satised that whoever it is interacting with really can decrypt Signed ElGamal ciphertexts. It picks two random messages, asks a challenge query and takes a discrete logarithm to win the CCA game with overwhelming probability 8 .
Our proof strategy will be to give an ecient simulation of phases 1 and 2
(which means dealing with Ψ ) and to argue that no copy of A n will ever reach phase 3 in less than exponential time, unless the reduction solves IES or DDH.
In the proof we will make three case distinctions. Recall that R is a reduction from CCA of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA of plain ElGamal.
1. R answers the IND-CPA challenger's query without any copy of the adversary reaching Phase 3. In this case, we can simulate all copies of the adversary by lazily sampling the random function Ψ to obtain an IND-CPA adversary that wins its game with the same probability as R given access to a CCA adversary that always guesses correctly.
2. R answers a decryption query on a ciphertext without using special soundness. We build a metareduction to IES.
3. Neither of the above cases occur. In this case one copy of the adversary we are simulating proceeds to the point where it would have to use its discrete logarithm capability hence it must have got answers to all n decryption queries. In this case we show that the reduction must have launched Ω(2 n ) copies of the adversary.
8 The probability is not exactly 1 because m0 and m1 could collide.
Case 1: the reduction solves DDH by itself
If the reduction answers its IND-CPA challenge without getting any copy of the adversary to run to phase 3 then the reduction must be breaking indistinguishability by itself . In this case we can just simulate the adversary eciently for as long as needed. 
Case 2: The reduction breaks IES
If the reduction R does run a copy of the adversary to phase 3, we can hope that it solves IES for us along the way. We dene a metareduction M 2 that simulates individual copies of A n as follows, with joint state between the copies in two global variables U, V . All other variables are local to each simulated copy of the adversary.
if not check(R, A, Z) then abort this copy of A n endif endfor oracle check(R, A, Z):
if β = 1 and φ < 2 then abort and return (j, Z)
to OMvIES challenger else return β endif oracle draw(S):
Our metareduction M 2 simulates both the adversary and challenger interfaces towards the reduction R and interacts with an OMvIES challenger. On the challenger interface M 2 passes the challenger's public key. By assumption, R is key-passing so although the simulated adversaries formally receive a public key from R we could equally well have the metareduction provide them with this key directly. If the reduction asks an IND-CPA challenge query, we just simulate this challenge query (picking a random bit b); since we have already dealt with case 1 we can ignore the reduction returning a guess to the challenger for now.
In detail, our metareduction operates as follows. Initially, it obtains a value X from its OMvIES challenger and hands control to the reduction R. When R asks to invoke a new copy of the adversary A, metareduction M 2 simulates a copy of A using public key X (since R is key-passing) using the algorithms in the code listing above. The oracles check, draw and chal are shared between all copies of the simulated adversary. R.alg means we call back to R, simulating the adversary calling its challenger's oracle named alg whereas I.alg means call the oracle named alg on the OMvIES challenger.
If the reduction makes a challenge query (to its IND-CPA challenger) the metareduction draws a random bit b and simulates the challenge ciphertext; if the reduction R makes a guess at b then the metareduction aborts (this is case 1 which we have dealt with above). If R manages to get a copy of the simulated adversary to phase 3, the metareduction M 2 aborts too this is case 3 which we will deal with later.
The check, draw and chal oracles help the metareduction M 2 simulate multiple copies of A n using only one OMvIES challenger. The draw oracle ensures that multiple copies of the adversary who receive identical (random oracle) replies from R also produce identical ciphertexts. In a table U the metareduction keeps track of whether a particular adversary state S has been encountered before; if so we can simply replay the same ciphertexts.
The chal oracle is responsible for completing the proofs in Signed ElGamal ciphertexts. The table V maps each OMvIES instance (R, A) to the following parameters:
The integer j is the index required to tell the challenger to operate on this particular instance.
The potential φ is the equivalent of the OMDL potential in Bernhard et al. 's proof [5] and matches the potential f stored internally by the OMvIES challenger.
• The rst time a particular instance (R, A) is used (case φ = 0), chal uses the OMvIES challenge oracle to complete the proof.
• In case φ = 1, if the current challenge has been used before then the reduction is replaying one adversary copy's responses to a second copy.
In this case the metareduction replays the response s that it computed earlier. If c is fresh on the other hand, then the reduction has forked two copies of the adversary on the random oracle call in this proof and is about to recover the discrete logarithm r by applying special soundness. In this case our metareduction M 2 opens the instance.
• In case φ = 2 the instance has already been opened, so M 2 knows the values a, r necessary to make the proof itself.
The values c , s in a V -entry store the challenge and response from a previous chal query. These values are used in case φ = 1 and the reduction replays the same c , in which case the metareduction replies with the same s .
The values r , a store the discrete logarithms of R, A when φ = 2. then the reduction has given us some information that we do not know already (the instance in question is unopened) and we solve OMvIES.
The above arguments show that whenever R decrypts an unopened challenge instance, the metareduction M 2 breaks OMvIES. It remains to show that R cannot distinguish M from multiple, independent copies of A n running on the same random string. Recall that in Figure 4 we have the following invariants.
1. Two copies of A n that receive identical messages from R also produce identical messages/calls back to R.
This is because all copies execute on the same random string and do not communicate with anyone except R. 2. R can inuence copies of A n in exactly three places: answering random oracle queries in phase 1, decryption queries in phase 2 and the challenge query in phase 3.
3. The moment that two copies of A n get dierent answers to a random oracle query, the two copies become independent of each other.
If at some point two copies U, V get dierent answers c U = c V to the same random oracle query then their states S U , S V will become distinct from then on and never coincide again (since we only ever append to state vectors).
Since the randomness used to construct Signed ElGamal ciphertexts is drawn using a random function Ψ from the current state S, the ciphertexts in two copies with dierent states are independent. This follows from r, a, m being drawn by a random function on distinct inputs.
5. In phase 2, a copy of A n will proceed past a decryption query (and not abort) if and only if the decryption is correct.
These invariants will let us show that the values received by R when interacting with M 2 or multiple copies of A n are identically distributed. We use induction over the sequence of all calls made to R in a particular execution. Before the rst call, the distributions of all values sent to R are certainly equal.
For a RO call, there are two cases. If this call is made by a copy of the adversary that has received the exact same sequence of inputs and outputs as some other copy has received previously, then it will return the same values (X, C, D, A) as the previous copy. This holds for A n as the state S of the copy that sent the current call will match the state S of the previous copy at the time it sent the equivalent call, so the values C, D, A will be equal (and X is constant in any case).
In M 2 , the oracle draw ensures that the same state S leads to the same values (R, A, d) being returned.
For a fresh RO call (that does not match the case above), the value X is constant and the values R, D, A are uniformly random and independent of each other and all values sent to the reduction R so far. In A n this holds because S is fresh and the values in question are therefore obtained by a random function on distinct, fresh inputs (since m is uniform, so is M and because M is not used elsewhere, so is M Y r ). In M 2 a fresh S causes (R, A) to be sampled from the OMvIES challenger so they are uniform and independent of previous values as expected; D is also a fresh, uniform group element.
The value s in a decryption query is completely determined by the matching C, D, A and c all of which R has seen before in the matching random oracle query, or in the case of c the reduction R has chosen the value itself. This holds in both A n and M 2 .
It follows that up until some adversary copy reaches phase 3, R cannot tell M 2 from A n and must therefore have a negligibly close IND-CPA advantages in both experiments.
Case 3: the reduction takes exponential time
This case is essentially the same argument as that of Bernhard et al. [5] . If the reduction R when interacting with M 2 ever gets a copy of the simulated adversary to phase 3 (in which case M 2 aborts) then it must have launched at least 2 n copies of the adversary. Lemma 3. Consider an execution of M 2 with any reduction R that results in one copy of the simulated adversary advancing to phase 3. Then R must have launched 2 n copies of the adversary.
If a copy of the adversary simulated by M 2 advances to phase 3, we know that neither has R returned a guess at β (this would have halted the entire execution as in Case 1) nor has the check oracle aborted because OMvIES has been solved (Case 2). In particular, R has never answered a decryption query on a ciphertext linked to an OMvIES instance at potential φ ≤ 1.
We build a complete binary tree of depth n representing points in the execution of R with our metareduction where the adversary must have been forked on Schnorr proofs. Our aim is to show that each leaf of the tree must reference a distinct copy of the adversary, hence there must have been at least 2 n copies overall launched by R. We rst give the invariants of our tree and prove that these imply distinct adversary copies in the leaves. Then we will construct a tree meeting these invariants from any execution that reaches phase 3.
The nodes in our tree have labels (i, k) where i is an identier for some copy of the adversary (for example, one can number the copies in the order that they begin phase 1) and k ≤ n is an integer referencing a particular decryption query.
Our nodes will have the following invariants.
Recall that our adversary A n performs decryption queries in reverse order after it has got all n challenges, so the rst decryption query uses the n-th challenge etc. This explains the reversed indexing n − (k − 1) of the referenced challenges for the ( * , k − 1) nodes in the last property.
If we can construct such a complete binary tree rooted at (i, n) where i is the copy of the adversary that reached phase 3 then we claim that all 2 n leaves of this tree represent distinct copies of the adversary, proving our exponential lower bound. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that two distinct leaves L = (j, 0) and M = (j , 0) refer to the same copy of the adversary, i.e. j = j . Then consider the unique path from the one leaf to the other in the tree, and the highest (i.e.
closest to the root) node R = (i, k) on this path. R will have two children A and B, since R is not itself a leaf by construction. W.l.o.g. L is a descendant or equal to A and M is a descendant or equal to B. The contradiction is that by invariant 3, A and B must dier in their n − k + 1st challenge (part 1 of the invariant) whereas all descendants of A, including L, must share their n − k + 1st challenge with A (by applying part 2 of the invariant to A). Similarly, M must share challenge n − k + 1 with B and therefore L, M must dier in challenge n − k + 1. It follows that j = j and that there must be 2 n distinct copies of the adversary referenced in the leaves, hence R must have launched this many copies.
To construct the tree from an execution that reaches phase 3, we pick the copy i of the adversary A n that reached phase 3 and use (i, n) as the root; this trivially meets all invariants. We repeatedly give each node (j, l) with l > 0 two children as follows. The rst child of (j, l) is simply (j, l − 1). Invariant 1 carries over as the second component of the node decreases, invariants 2 and 3(1) are trivially satised.
The core of the tree construction is in the choice of the second child for each node. For the second child of (j, l) with l > 0 we observe that since copy j has got an answer to its l-th decryption query yet M 2 has not solved OMvIES with this answer, the corresponding IES instance must be at φ = 2. Therefore some other copy j of the adversary must have triggered the opening of this instance, before copy j got its l-th decryption query answered. This other copy j must therefore have shared challenges 1 up to n−l with j and been forked on challenge n−l+1
to open the IES instance in question. And this forking can only have happened after j had its own l − 1st decryption query answered, since it must have been the lth decryption query of j that triggered the opening. It follows that we can pick (j , l − 1) as our second child of (j, l) to satisfy all the invariants.
Taken together, our three cases show that a key-passing black-box reduction R from IND-CPA security of Signed ElGamal to IND-CPA security of plain ElGamal must either solve DDH, or IES, or run in exponential time. This proves our Theorem 1.
Conclusion
CCA security is often presented as the correct notion for public-key encryption and Signed ElGamal is very tempting to use due to its short ciphertexts and fast computation. However, Signed ElGamal has never been proven CCA secure in the plain ROM (without algebraic or generic-group assumptions).
Our results do not disprove CCA security of Signed ElGamal in the plain ROM nor yield an attack against CCA of Signed ElGamal in typical implementations. What they do is further limit the techniques available to anyone wishing to prove CCA security. Where Shoup and Gennaro [16] showed that the obvious proof does not work and Bernhard et al. [5] excluded proofs based on extracting the Schnorr proof 's randomness, which seems to us to be overly strong even the honest decryptor holding the secret key cannot learn the randomness without taking a discrete logarithm we exclude all proofs by reduction to IND-CPA of plain ElGamal that do not make use of at least one non-standard step, such as treating the adversary in a non-black box manner. We would recommend caution before using Signed ElGamal in a scenario where CCA security is really called for (if NM-CPA is sucient, so is Signed ElGamal).
At this point, our result works for key-passing reductions only. Our metareduction to IES requires the reduction to launch its adversary copies with the same public key that it got from its (simulated) IND-CPA challenger. In particular, if instead of reducing to IND-CPA of ElGamal, one wishes to reduce to a problem such as DDH directly, there is no notion of a key anymore so such reductions seem not to be covered 9 . Key-passing seems to be a common way to build a reduction to the CPA security of ElGamal, and has been used in the proofs of previous results on Signed ElGamal [17, 14] with some additional knowledge assumption. Alternatively, one may consider the implications of restricting to algebraic or generic reductions unlike algebraic adversaries, this seems a sound choice to us as there do not seem to be any non-algebraic reductions in discrete-logarithm based schemes. Potentially, this could not only eliminate the key-passing requirement but also show an impossibility of a reduction to any natural problem over groups as in Fleischhacker et al. [12] . We will investigate this problem in future research. 9 We thank an anonymous reviewer from a previous draft of this paper for commenting on this point. Interestingly, if such a reduction were to exist, the underlying hard problem would either have to not reduce to IND-CPA of plain ElGamal itself, or the combination of reductions (Signed ElGamal to hard problem to IND-CPA of ElGamal) would itself have to be non-key-passing to avoid our impossibility result.
Another interesting question is whether IES is hard in the generic group model. Our best answer at the moment is that IES is out of scope of the generic model: as dened by Shoup, the model allows an adversary to start with arbitrary information and perform generic computations on the group elements in the adversary's input, but it does not allow for information relating to the adversary's group inputs to be revealed adaptively during the execution. This is exactly what IES does and it seems to us that one would have to extend the model to capture this, leading to the question how one would validate such a new model.
